The quantity and frequency of non-destructive testing (NDT) across the life cycle of a missile inventory must be carefully considered. This paper provides a process for optimizing the quantity of missiles subject to NDT across the life of the missile inventory. This process ensures that the program does not exceed the minimum test quantity necessary to ensure that the inventory continues to meet the user's reliability requirement based on the predicted failure probability and annual test quantity. The methodology takes into account the age distribution of the inventory, tested/untested populations, removal of failing hardware, and items with multiple tests through the system life. The analysis also provides an estimate of the minimum and maximum test time that missiles will be exposed to across the projected life of the inventory. The paper provides an example of the process as applied to a representative Army missile system. This example demonstrates the practicality and simplicity of the process. The affect of varying levels of NDT on the inventory reliability is readily apparent in graphical form that facilitates the Reliability Engineer in presenting options to the Program Manager for making sustainment decisions. Overall, the U.S. Army Stockpile Reliability Program (SRP) has repeatedly demonstrated successes in identifying trends, ensuring readiness, and justifying missile shelf life extensions. However, under the current era of decreasing defense budgets, and expectations to push the life of existing missile systems out without replacement, NDT costs should be minimized while simultaneously minimizing the wear of those tests on the inventory. The approach outlined in this paper can be used to accomplish this on either the existing NDT program for a fielded system, or by the Program Manager developing a SRP program plan for a new missile system.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Army requires a SRP be conducted on all fielded ammunition items [1] .
The SRP assesses the continuing safety, reliability, and performance of the inventory as associated to age, manufacturing strata, and storage/handling environments. SRP data is collected over the life of the item from functional testing, laboratory component testing, and NDT. Due to complexity and high unit cost, NDT is a highly leveraged portion of the SRP for missile systems. This testing allows the Army to retain good missiles in the inventory while: (1) Identifying and segregating failing hardware, (2) Collecting parametric data for reliability and performance trend analysis, and (3) Determining degradation trends associated with specific populations of the inventory. These NDT's can exercise the majority of a missile system, to include the seeker, guidance, and actuator sections. Only the energetic items such as motors, warheads, and safe & arm devices cannot be fully evaluated through these tests.
Life Cycle Cost and Availability
Missiles commonly achieve useful shelf life of more than 20 years. The method of conducting the SRP is initially established and documented in an SRP Plan during development. This plan identifies the quantities, sample sources, and test methodologies that will be used. The plan is frequently reviewed during the life of the system, and is revised based on lessons-learned and analyses of previous SRP results. Although NDT is highly valued because it reduces the expenditure of missiles for functional (flight) testing or destructive disassembly for laboratory component testing, it is extremely costly to retain the test personnel, maintain the test equipment, and execute the effort. Additionally, the logistics of moving the test equipment to missiles or missiles to the test equipment can be problematical and costly. If missiles need to be returned to a test facility, they are not available to the theater commander for use. It can take in excess of a year to return these assets to overseas inventories. Quantities of missiles identified by the SRP Plan to be non-destructively tested directly impacts the life cycle cost and missile availability.
Reduced Life and Induced Failures
Non-destructive testing also generates concern of overexercising the missiles. The majority of U.S. Army missiles are designed for long term storage with a short deployment period prior to expenditure in a brief mission period (often seconds). However, NDT's can exercise the missile system for much longer periods than one mission, and the same missile may see NDT several times across its life cycle. For example, the NDT for one Army system takes 29.3 times longer than the maximum mission flight time. Since Army missile systems generally exceed 20 years of shelf life, this same missile is likely to be tested multiple times, with NDT time potentially exceeding over 100 missions.
Additionally, the handling involved in moving the missiles to the test site, opening the containers and exposing them to non-dormant environments may induce failures or reduce system life. Mishandled items can be damaged, or improperly repackaged. Environmentally controlled test facilities are often not possible due to remote locations of the missiles, or the large safe distances required around a live missile test. Testing across the life of a system should be minimized to reduce damage and exposure times.
DEVELOPING A NON-DESTRUCTIVE REQUIREMENT
The level of NDT efficacy varies significantly between missile systems. A missile may be limited to top-level electronics built-in-testing, or it may be capable of having the fin actuators fully functioned while it is 'flown' in a sixdegree-of-freedom virtual environment at a simulated target. Obviously the information obtained on the health of the inventory, and the rate of failing hardware that is removed is significantly different in these two cases. However, the requirements established during development never address the NDT reliability requirement. This value will be referred to as testable reliability (R T ). Generally, missiles have upper system level reliability requirements that may include elements of pre-flight reliability, in-flight reliability, or mission reliability (includes probability of acquisition, probability of kill, etc). These include the gunner's capability to identify failing missiles prior to a mission, but they do not address the capability to identify failures in a 'test' environment. Therefore, the question of what value of R T is acceptable must first be determined. If 1% of the missiles subject to the current NDT program are failing (R T =0.99), is this acceptable? How about 5% (R T =0.95)?
Requirement Methodology
There is a minimum reliability requirement that is generally common between missile systems. It may vary slightly in definition, but it is basically the probability that a missile, randomly issued/selected from the inventory, will pass user pre-flight check-out, successfully launch, fly to target, and detonate. It may be designated differently, but this 'user requirement' (R U ) is either specified, or may be an element of the specified system or mission requirements. For example, a system may have a pre-flight reliability requirement (R PF ) and an in-flight (launch-flight-detonation) reliability requirement (R IF ). In this case, the user requirement is the product of the terms: R U = R PF * R IF (1) Missiles selected for flight testing undergo NDT prior to launch. It is important to identify any failures prior to launch, so that hardware can be analyzed for root cause. Once it is launched, the hardware is damaged or destroyed, and the capability to confidently determine root cause is often lost. Even though all test missiles undergo NDT, flight failures are still experienced. These failures represent that portion that cannot be identified during NDT. The flight test reliability (R FT ) is not equivalent to R IF because not every missile launched by the user is subject to the same level of NDT as missiles are prior to formal flight testing. Note in equation (2) that the product of R T and R FT also provide an estimate of the user reliability being demonstrated in flight testing.
R U Dem = R T * R FT (2) If the system is meeting the specified user requirement then: R T * R FT > R U ( 3 ) In most cases, an initial estimate of R FT can be made during development and production. NDT's are performed prior to any flight tests during development and production, and these capabilities are often transitioned directly into the NDT equipment used by SRP. Often the determination of which failures could have been identified by the gunner prior to launch and those that could not is performed for 'scoring' purposes in order to calculate the reliability associated to the various system requirements (pre-flight reliability, in-flight reliability, or mission reliability). For example, a missile may experience failure during NDT, but be scored as an in-flight failure, because the user would not have been able to identify it as failing hardware, and would have launched it. Basically, what are often being measured during development/production are R T and R FT , but we are scoring the failures against different, more field/combat representative criteria.
Knowing a minimum value for R U and the estimate for R FT allows us to determine a minimum reliability value for NDT:
This may appear simple, but it is not specified, and calculation of this parameter allows the SRP program to be optimized to ensure that the user requirement continues to be met throughout the projected life of the system. If the R T Min being demonstrated during exceeds the minimum value as described in equation (4), then the system is meeting the user requirement.
It should be noted that R U does not change, but after a system has been fielded for an extended period of time, an increasing trend in flight failures (decreasing R FT ) may be associated to missile age. These are due to failures of components that cannot be identified and removed through non-destructive testing. In this case, the applicable trend line equation can be used to represent R FT in order to plot a trending R T Min requirement versus missile age.
Example for a Fielded System
A system is demonstrating flight test reliability of 0.96 in SRP tests. The original user reliability requirement, to include pre-flight check-out, successful launch, flight, and detonation is 0.94. Therefore, the minimum NDT reliability that the system should be demonstrating is: R T Min = 0.94 / 0.96 = 0.979 (5) In other words, if more than 2.1 percent of missiles being processed through NDT are failing, then the system is no longer meeting the user reliability requirement.
PREDICTING INVENTORY TESTABLE RELIABILITY

Inventory Reliability Degradation Versus Wear-Out
Tactical missile systems consist of various material types (e.g., explosives, adhesives, lubricants, electronic components, composites, plastics, etc.) that are subject to different agerelated failure mechanisms. The majority of the inventory, which is in dormant storage, will experience failures over time. These failures are part of the normal operating life of the system, and historic data indicates this constant failure rate is somewhat independent of storage and handling conditions that are within design specifications. At some point, the rate of one or more of these failure modes, or a new one, may accelerate and lead to system wear-out. The inventory would be replaced with new procurement, or reworked to change out or repair the wear-out component(s). One of the most critical goals of SRP is to identify as far as possible in advance when a system is approaching wear-out. However, this paper generally addresses only the operating portion of the life cycle. If a missile system is experiencing a constant failure rate but failures are not being identified, the failing missiles will remain in the inventory available for issue/use. In this case, the inventory will experience a decrease in user reliability over time, even though the system has not reached wear-out. Non-destructive testing can identify a portion of these failures and segregate them from the issuable inventory. By removing these failures, NDT increases the user reliability of an aging inventory. Additionally, NDT can actually reduce some failure modes exacerbated by inactivity (e.g., hardening lubricants, drying seals, and mechanical nesting). However, cost, over-testing, impact on availability, and decreasing return on investment prohibit NDT on 100 percent of the inventory annually.
Predicting Inventory Non-Destructive Test Reliability
As SRP collects NDT data over time, this data can be analyzed to provide an estimate of the unreliability versus age of the testable hardware. The data must be screened to identify only mission-affecting failures of rounds not previously tested. There are multiple approaches to this regression analysis in technical literature, and it is not the intent of this paper to address the best approach for every data set. But basically, by segregating the data into year groups, dividing the number tested in each year group into the number from that year group that passed, the R T versus age (years) can be plotted. As shown in Figure 1 the slope of the linear trend line applied to this plot is referred to as Q A .
This plot would only predict an inventory's testable reliability (R TI ) if every missile was produced in the same year. In that case, at one year old the inventory will have an estimated testable unreliability of Q A . When the inventory is two years old it will have an estimated testable unreliability of twice Q A , and so forth. It also does not account for removal of failing missiles or multiple testing.
If a system is new, and Q A cannot be estimated from historic data, then it can often be predicted based on the nondestructive failure probability recorded during development and production tests, or from similar systems. 
Equation (6) sums the predicted number of failures in each production year group in the current year, where A PYN is the age of the missiles in production year N and N PYN is the quantity of missiles in production year N. The quantity of failures that have already been observed though NDT (N FO ) are subtracted to account for these failures having been already identified and repaired. The numerator represents the number of estimated failing missiles remaining unidentified in the inventory. Dividing this by the total quantity in the inventory (N I ) provides the current year unreliability (Q IO ), which would be the probability of failure that would be expected to be demonstrated if 100% of the inventory was subjected to NDT in current year.
The inventory's predicted testable reliability by calendar year R TI can now be estimated simply by plotting a line with slope Q A from the point of current year and R TIO . Figure 2 provides an example of this plot which also incorporates an R T Min described in section 2. Without NDT this inventory is forecast to fall below the user reliability requirement in 2015.
Figure 2 -Predicted inventory R TI versus Calendar Year
If η represents the number of years since current year Q I = Q IO + η*Q A ( 8 ) If this analysis is performed early in the program, N FO may be assumed to be zero since it will have negligible impact or, if Q A is being predicted during development, the N FO may actually be zero. However, if this analysis is performed late, not only will N FO need to be taken into account, but also the 'reset' age of the missiles already tested. In this case, the numerator in equation (6) 
This equation demonstrates how NDT resets the age of the testable components from production year to the number of years since the missile was tested (A TYN ), and the number of new failures being generated since the test can be estimated by the quantity tested in that year (N TYN ). The quantity of missiles tested from each production year (N PYNT ) must then be deducted from the number of remaining untested missiles in each production year. It grows rapidly more complex to account for retests in the R TIO estimate, and in performing the subsequent optimization herein, so performing this analysis early is crucial.
Example of R TI Prediction
Assume Figure 1 represents the Q A estimate for the system initially described in Section 2.2. We now need to know the production profile for that system in order to determine if it is still meeting the user reliability requirement.
Figure 3 -Production profile for sample system
Figure 3 provides a sample production profile that is not unusual for an actual Army missile system. This profile represents a low rate initial production period, with ramp up to full production. In current year 2012, it represents a total remaining inventory of 14,000 missiles, ranging in age from five to ten years old. The estimated unreliability in the table at the bottom of the figure represents the product of Q A (0.029 in this case) and the age of missiles in that production year group. Assuming that the number failing rounds identified thus far is negligible, the 2012 inventory NDT failure probability (Q IO ) is calculated as shown in equation (10). {0.0029[(10*303) + (9*608) + (8*843) + (7*1872) + (6*5555) + (5*4819)] -0} / 14,000 = 0.0178 (10) This predicts an unreliability of 1.78 percent in 2012, or current inventory testable reliability estimate of 98.22 percent. Since the system has an R T Min of 97.9 percent it is still meeting the user requirement with a slim margin. Plotting R TIO and extending a line with slope Q A provides the plot of forecast R TI in Figure 3 , and the prediction that, without NDT, the inventory will fall below the user reliability requirement in 2013.
Figure 4 -Predicted R TI w/o NDT and breach point of R U
Non-destructive testing can help to keep this inventory's reliability above the user requirement. The question of how many per year need to be tested remains to be addressed.
OPTIMIZING A NON DESTRUCTIVE TEST PROGRAM
Obviously, the impact of NDT on R TI is associated to the quantity tested each year (N T ). However, it is also dependent on whether the failed rounds are removed or repaired, and on which missiles are being tested. Addressing the first variable is not difficult. If the missiles are repaired and returned, then the total inventory size (N I ) remains constant. If the items are removed and demilitarized or used for training, then the total inventory quantity only needs to be adjusted downward each year. However, the second variable is more troublesome. If the oldest missiles are tested first, then the next oldest, and so forth, the equations in the following section become much more cumbersome. However, due to worldwide positioning of the inventory, and impacts of operations that cannot be foreseen, it is almost always impossible to assume the oldest untested assets will be tested first, and the next oldest tested in the subsequent year, etc. Often, all that we can assume is that items not previously tested will be tested first, and those items will be a cross-section of the available inventory. It can be shown mathematically that the equations in the following section apply to the case where number tested from each production year (N PYNT ) is proportional to the production year populations. That is:
N PYNT = N T (N PYN /N I ) (11) This is an acceptable assumption based on testing by availability, and the following equations provide a reasonable approximation of the impact of N T on R TI . Additionally, N T is assumed to be constant in order to simplify the equations. This is reasonable based on budgeting and executing a continuous level of effort SRP program. However, once the equations are set up in a spreadsheet, it is not difficult to vary the N T by calendar year.
Calculating Testable Unreliability of the NDT Inventory
If N T is increased, more failing items will be identified, removed from the issuable inventory and R TI in the subsequent year will increase. By predicting the number of failures that will be identified based on the number of missiles that are non-destructively tested, we can adjust the Q I equation (8) to account for the removal of this failing hardware. The inventory is developing two populations: those untested and those tested. The testable unreliability of an inventory subject to NDT (Q IT ), as shown in equation (12), is the sum of predicted failures in the untested population (N FU ) and failures in the tested population (N FT ) divided by the total inventory quantity. This equation will be broken down to address each term separately in equation (13) as failure probability for the untested population (Q U ), and failure probability for the tested population (Q T ).
Q IT = (N FU + N FT ) / N I = (N FU / N I ) + (N FT / N I ) (12) Q IT = Q U + Q T (13) The untested population has a failure probability as previously derived in equation (8). However, the quantity in this population is being reduced by the product of η and N T annually (assuming a constant N T ). Equation (14) (15) As discussed in Section 3.2, the testable unreliability of missiles that have undergone NDT has been 'reset' to the number of years since NDT (η). One the year after they have been tested, they will again be failing at Q A , in the subsequent year at twice Q A , and so forth. The testable unreliability of this population in year η is provided in equation (16). To provide the basis of this, equation (17) The failure probability equations for Q U and Q T are combined in equation (18) to provide the unreliability estimate for a population subject to annual NDT tests on N T quantity of missiles. The failure probability in this equation approximates the posture of the inventory at the beginning of the year. That is, if NDT is initiated at the rate of N T in 'current year', then at the end of current year/start of the year represented by η = 1 there will be N T less missiles in the inventory failing at Q I and N T missiles with a zero testable failure probability since they have just undergone NDT.
This equation is only valid until all missiles have been subject to a single test. It does not account for retesting of missiles a second time. However, as will be demonstrated by the example in the following section, the level of NDT required to meet R T Min is generally identified well prior to the point of inventory retesting.
Application to Determine Q T Required to Sustain R U
The example inventory can now be analyzed using the information in Section 4.1 to determine the approximate quantity of missiles that should undergo NDT annually (N T ) in order to ensure that the user reliability requirement continues to be met. Using the same data developed for the example system in Sections 2.2 and 3.3, all of the variables in equation (18) (22) up in spreadsheets that calculated R TI at varying levels of N T and plotted this data in a single chart. This plot, provided in Figure 5 , also incorporates the R T Min of 0.979 developed in Section 2.2. This figure emphasizes the impact that NDT can have on a stockpile. Even though NDT of this inventory was initiated after a level of degradation down to R TI only slightly above the user limit, annual NDT testing of 1200 rounds per year will ensure the system continues to meet the user requirement. This process also identifies over-testing; when the R TI is growing above the user related requirement of R T Min . This is demonstrated well in Figure 5 for an NDT program of 1400 missiles per year. Over-testing is also projected to occur for 1200 per year after calendar year 2018. The analysis should be revisited throughout the life of the system to determine if the level of N T is still appropriate. Since R T Min is associated to the system's flight reliability performance (R FT ) as described in Section 2.2, if R FT experiences degradation, R T Min would increase. In this case, N T can be increased to achieve this increasing requirement and ensure R U continues to be met. Figure 5 also demonstrates when under-testing is not providing sufficient return on investment. For the example inventory, a Q T of less than 600 per year does not provide significant improvement in R TI over a program with no NDT testing.
Considerations for Application and Improvement
The basic approach is suitable for planning, or assessing an existing NDT program. Although some assumptions are made, they are reasonable for a larger inventory, and work best for assessments performed earlier in the lifecycle. In addition, using the basic approach, the equations and calculations can be modified to take into account specific subsets of inventory previously subject to NDT, or updating the analysis based on data collected. The equations can also be modified to account for failing missiles being removed from the inventory, or for altering the quantity being tested annually.
If the process is used during development, the estimate of annual failure probability will be a prediction. However, based on early test data and similar systems, a reasonable prediction will allow the SRP planner to develop a basis for prescribing the annual NDT quantity. Since the stockpile will not have been fully fielded, the 'planned' production profile is used to estimate Q IO , and the planned start year for the NDT program is used as current year in the process outlined.
Not all missile systems employ a structured NDT program. If the system is not capable of being tested nondestructively at a level that provides any relevant indication of item condition, the SRP program may utilize only destructive testing. This is further discussed in [2] , where a method for developing the overall SRP approach for a new missile system is presented.
